FAILURE CHAIN · EP009 · SOURCES
RMS Titanic (struck 11.40 p.m., 14 April 1912; foundered 2.20 a.m., 15 April 1912)
How to read this page. Each row is one claim. "Source and page" gives the document and the page in it. "Verbatim" is the exact text from that page. Status: VERIFIED and FINDING are stated by the official report; INFERENCE is the report's own reconstruction; TESTIMONY is attributed evidence; CONTESTED means the sources disagree.
Sources
| Key | Document | Public copy |
|---|---|---|
| MR | British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry: Report on the Loss of the "Titanic" (s.s.), Lord Mersey, 30 July 1912 (US reprint, Senate Document No. 933). | open |
| SR | US Senate Committee on Commerce: "Titanic" Disaster, Senate Report No. 806 (Smith subcommittee), 1912. | open |
| W | British Inquiry evidence of Edward Wilding, naval architect, Harland & Wolff, Days 18–20 (June 1912). | open |
| SS | Speech of Senator William Alden Smith in the Senate, 28 May 1912 (S. Doc. 850). A senator's speech, not the committee's findings. | open |
| SOLAS | International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 20 January 1914 (Canada Sessional Paper No. 129, 1914). | open |
A · Identity, verdicts, framing
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-001 | British verdict: the loss was due to collision with an iceberg, brought about by excessive speed (30 July 1912). Q.24(a) gives the cause as collision and foundering. | MR PDF p.7, printed p.5; MR PDF p.87, printed p.85 (Report of the Court) | "the loss of the said ship was due to collision with an iceberg, brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated." … "Dated this 30th day of July, 1912." … "Collision with an iceberg and the subsequent foundering of the ship." | FINDING | The one-sentence formal finding of the Court, signed by Mersey and all five assessors. Speed is the only cause named in it. Q.24(a) is worded narrowly; speed appears in the formal finding and in Q.14 (T-057). The Court sat 37 times and examined 97 witnesses (Introduction). |
| T-002 | The US Senate subcommittee (Chairman William Alden Smith) examined 82 witnesses: 53 British and 29 American. | SR AmInqRep02 (Report, opening) | "We examined 82 witnesses upon various phases of this catastrophe, including the examination of 53 British subjects or residents of Great Britain and 29 citizens of United States or residents thereof." | VERIFIED | The titanicinquiry.org editor's introduction says '86 witnesses'. That is the website's own note, not the report text. Use 82. |
| T-003 | Senate Report No. 806 was presented with Senator Smith's speech of 28 May 1912. The speech was printed separately as S. Doc. 850. | SS PDF p.7; SR AmInqRep01 (SS title page; SR title) | SS: "MAY 28, 1912" / SR: "REPORT No. 806" | VERIFIED | The titanicinquiry transcription of the report carries no date line. The 28 May 1912 date comes from the GPO print of Smith's speech (title page). The report itself is not in sources/ as a page scan (see manifest gap). |
| T-004 | British answers to Q.25 and Q.2: she was properly constructed and adequately equipped, and she complied with the Merchant Shipping Acts and rules. | MR PDF p.87, printed p.85; MR PDF p.80, printed p.78 (Q.25 and Q.2 answers) | "was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and emigrant ship for the Atlantic service? Answer. Yes." … "and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of "passenger steamers" and "emigrant ships?" Answer. Yes." | FINDING | Important counterweight for the episode: the British court did NOT find the ship badly built. See T-016 and T-017. She was legal. The lifeboat gap was a gap in the rule, not a breach of it (section J). |
B · Ship's particulars
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-005 | Titanic: three-screw steamer of 46,328 tons gross, built by Harland & Wolff for the White Star Line. | MR PDF p.13, printed p.11 (I. The steamship Titanic) | "The Titanic was a three-screw vessel of 46,328 tons gross and 21,831 net register tons, built by Messrs. Harland & Wolff for the White Star Line service between Southampton and New York." | VERIFIED | The Senate report also gives 46,328 tons but calls it 'tons register' (SR, General Particulars). |
| T-006 | Length and breadth differ between the inquiries: 852.5 ft by 92.5 ft registered (British) and 882.6 ft by 92.6 ft (Senate). | MR PDF p.13, printed p.11; SR AmInqRep03 (MR registered dimensions table; SR General Particulars) | MR: "Length 852.50" / MR: "Breadth 92.50" / SR: "her length was 882.6 feet, and her breadth was 92.6 feet." | CONTESTED | The British figure is explicitly the registered dimension. The Senate does not say which measure it uses. 882.6 ft is probably overall length, but neither source says so; attribute any length figure you use. |
| T-007 | Launched 31 May 1911. The builders had no cost limit. The ship fully equipped cost £1,500,000 (about $7,500,000). | SR AmInqRep03 (SR General Particulars) | "No restriction as to limit of cost was placed upon the builders. She was launched May 31, 1911." … "The vessel, fully equipped, cost £1,500,000 sterling, or about $7,500,000." | VERIFIED | Senate report only. 'No limit of cost' is often turned into 'no expense spared on safety'. The report applies it to the builders' contract, not to safety. |
| T-008 | She was certified to carry far more people than were aboard: 3,547 lawfully (British) or 2,599 passengers plus 903 crew (Senate). | MR PDF p.66, printed p.64; SR AmInqRep03 (MR VI Board of Trade; SR General Particulars) | MR: "all that the vessel might lawfully have carried, viz, 3,547" / SR: "built to accommodate 2,599 passengers, with additional accommodations for officers and crew numbering 903 persons." | CONTESTED | 2,599 + 903 = 3,502, against 3,547. The two figures are not the same measure: one is the legal maximum, the other is accommodation. Either way, a full ship would have carried about three times her boat capacity (T-065). |
C · Subdivision design: what flooding she was built to survive
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-009 | 15 transverse watertight bulkheads, lettered A to P from forward, divided the ship into 16 compartments. | MR PDF p.14, printed p.12 (I. Structural arrangements) | "There were 15 transverse water-tight bulkheads, by which the ship was divided in the direction of her length into 16 separate compartments. These bulkheads are referred to as "A" to "P," commencing forward." | VERIFIED | The Senate report numbers the same bulkheads 1 to 15 (T-021). Bulkhead A = No. 1, the collision bulkhead. |
| T-010 | DESIGN STANDARD: she was designed to stay afloat with any TWO adjoining compartments flooded. | MR PDF p.25, printed p.23 (Structure: Water-tight subdivision) | "it was arranged that the bulkheads and divisions should be so placed that the ship would remain afloat in the event of any two adjoining compartments being flooded" | VERIFIED | Key for the working angle. The design rule was two compartments, not four. The 'four forward compartments' figure (T-037) is the court's after-the-fact calculation for the actual damage and loading. |
| T-011 | With any two compartments flooded, the minimum freeboard to the bulkhead-top deck was 2 ft 6 in to 3 ft. | MR PDF p.25, printed p.23 (Structure: Water-tight subdivision) | "The minimum freeboard that the vessel would have in the event of any two compartments being flooded was between 2 feet 6 inches and 3 feet from the deck adjoining the top of the water-tight bulkheads." | VERIFIED | Wilding gave the worst case as 2 ft 7 in (Q.20294). |
| T-012 | Wilding (Harland & Wolff): with two adjoining compartments flooded, the bulkhead tops stayed above water by about double the margin the 1891 Bulkheads Committee recommended. | W BOTInq19Wilding02 (Q.20293) | "It will be above the waterline by an amount which is about double the amount recommended by the bulkhead Committee in 1891" | TESTIMONY | Edward Wilding, Harland & Wolff naval architect, British Inquiry Day 19. The court adopted the substance in T-016. |
| T-013 | The two-compartment flooding plans were made during construction but were not submitted to the Board of Trade. | W BOTInq19Wilding02 (Q.20289) | "Were these plans submitted to the Board of Trade? - No." | TESTIMONY | Fits T-015: the Board had no power to approve subdivision unless the owner asked. |
| T-014 | The Senate report gives the design basis as 'any 2 main compartments'. It quotes Ismay as saying she would float with her 'two largest' compartments full. | SR AmInqRep05; SR AmInqRep03 (SR Watertight Compartments; SR General Particulars) | "the ship was so arranged that any 2 main compartments might be flooded without in any way involving the safety the ship." … ""especially constructed float with her two largest watertight compartments full of water."" | VERIFIED | Both inquiries agree the design basis was two compartments. 'Two largest' is Ismay's phrase, quoted, not the design rule. The transcription drops the words 'to' and 'of' ('constructed [to] float', 'safety [of] the ship'). |
| T-015 | The Board of Trade's only statutory power over subdivision was to require four watertight bulkheads. Owners asked for a Rule 12 subdivision review in only 103 cases in 18 years. | MR PDF p.79, printed p.77 (VI. Powers of the Board of Trade) | "All they have express power to insist upon in this connection with respect to any steam vessel is that there shall be four water-tight bulkheads" … "This supervision, I am told, they have been invited to exercise in only 103 cases over a period of 18 years." | FINDING | A regulatory gap the court named outright. It became Recommendation 5 (T-090). |
| T-016 | British finding: Titanic was efficiently designed for the contingencies she was meant to meet. Her bulkheads were of ample strength and higher than the 1891 standard required. | MR PDF p.79, printed p.77 (VI. Powers of the Board of Trade) | "The Titanic was efficiently designed and constructed to meet the contingencies which she was intended to meet." … "The bulkheads were of ample strength. They were sufficiently closely spaced and were carried up in the vessel to a height greater than sufficient to meet the requirements of the 1891 bulkheads committee." | FINDING | This qualifies the working angle. The British court did not call the bulkheads too low by the standard of the day. The story is that the damage was outside the design case (T-037), not that the ship was built below standard. |
| T-017 | ...but the court was also advised that more subdivision would probably have kept her afloat longer. | MR PDF p.79, printed p.77 (VI. Powers of the Board of Trade) | "But I am advised that the ship could have been further subdivided so that she would probably have remained afloat longer than she did." | FINDING | 'Longer', not 'saved'. Pair with T-042 to T-044. |
| T-018 | 12 vertical watertight doors in the boiler and engine rooms could all be closed at once from the bridge, taking 25–30 seconds. Floats also closed them automatically if water entered. | MR PDF p.15, printed p.13; MR PDF p.26, printed p.24 (I. Structural arrangements; Water-tight doors) | "There were 12 vertical sliding water-tight doors which completed the water-tightness of bulkheads D to O, inclusive, in the boiler and engine rooms. Those were capable of being simultaneously closed from the bridge." … "The time required for the doors to close was between 25 and 30 seconds." | VERIFIED | There were no sluice valves between compartments (same section). |
D · Bulkhead heights by deck
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-019 | Bulkhead tops: every transverse bulkhead reached at least E deck. A, B and K to P reached D deck. A reached C deck but was watertight only to D. | MR PDF p.15, printed p.13 (I. Structural arrangements) | "All the transverse bulkheads were carried up water-tight to at least the height of the E deck. Bulkheads A and B, and all bulkheads from K (90 feet abaft amidships) to P, both inclusive, further extended water-tight up to the underside of D deck. A bulkhead further extended to C deck, but it was water-tight only to D deck." | VERIFIED | So C, D, E, F, G, H and J (the bulkheads around the forward holds and the boiler rooms) stopped at E deck. The British table 'Extends up to underside of deck' lists A: C, B: D, C–J: E, K–P: D. |
| T-020 | Height of the bulkhead-top decks above the 34 ft 7 in waterline: E deck 11 ft amidships, 24 ft at the bow, 16 ft at the stern. D deck 20 ft, 33 ft and 25 ft. | MR PDF p.14, printed p.12 (I. Structural arrangements (deck table)) | "E | 11 0 | 24 0 | 16 0" … "D | 20 0 | 33 0 | 25 0" | VERIFIED | Table columns: lowest part amidships / at bow / at stern, in ft and in. F deck: 2 ft 6 in / 15 ft 6 in / 7 ft 6 in. Good on-screen graphic: the waterline rising toward an 11-foot margin amidships. |
| T-021 | Senate version: bulkhead 1 to C deck; Nos. 2 and 10–15 to D deck; Nos. 3–9 'only' to E deck. | SR AmInqRep05 (SR Watertight Compartments) | "only 1, the first bulkhead from forward, extended to the uppermost continuous deck, C; bulkheads Nos. 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 extended to the second continuous deck, D; and bulkheads Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 extended only to the third continuous deck, E." | VERIFIED | This matches the British table exactly (Nos. 3–9 = C to J). In the same section the Senate report also lists 'third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth' bulkheads as ending below E deck, leaving out the ninth, which is a small internal slip. |
| T-022 | The decks were not watertight, and every compartment had large hatchways, so water could rise freely. | MR PDF p.14, printed p.12; MR PDF p.15, printed p.13 (I. Structural arrangements) | "Except in small patches none of these decks was water-tight in the steel parts, except the weather deck and the orlop deck aft." … "All the decks had large openings or hatchways in them in each compartment, so that water could rise freely through them." | VERIFIED | This is the mechanical core of the 'spill-over' angle: the bulkheads were open-topped, like an ice-cube tray. |
| T-023 | Senate finding: the openings through E deck were not designed to close watertight, and flooding over E deck contributed largely to the sinking. The compartments were therefore 'NOT watertight'. | SR AmInqRep05 (SR Watertight Compartments) | "The openings through deck E were not designed for watertight closing, as the evidence shows that flooding over deck E contributed largely to the sinking of vessel." … "by reason of the non watertight character of the deck at which the transverse bulkheads ended, the supposedly watertight compartments were NOT watertight, and the sinking of the vessel followed." | FINDING | Strongest support for the bulkhead-height angle. The Senate frames it as a design weakness. The British frame it as exceeded design capacity (T-016). Present both. |
E · The collision and the damage
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-024 | Just before 11.40 p.m. (British) the lookout struck three bells and telephoned 'Iceberg right ahead'. The Senate report times it at 11.46 p.m. ship's time. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41; SR AmInqRep05 (MR II. The collision; SR Collision) | MR: "at a little before 11.40, one of the lookouts in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterward by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead."" / SR: "At 11.46 p.m. ship's time, or 10.13 p.m. New York time, Sunday evening, April 14, the lookout signaled the bridge" | CONTESTED | The British report uses 11.40 throughout. The Board of Trade's own Q.15 says 'at or about 11.45 p. m.' Use 11.40 p.m. (British) or attribute the time. |
| T-025 | Murdoch ordered 'Hard-a-starboard', rang 'Stop. Full speed astern', and closed the watertight doors. The bow had turned about two points to port when she struck. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41 (II. The collision) | "Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room "Stop. Full speed astern."" … "Mr. Murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms." | VERIFIED | 'Hard-a-starboard' was a tiller order and turned the bow to PORT. The report confirms the head 'fallen off about two points to port'. Do not animate a starboard turn. |
| T-026 | Olympic trials gave about 37 seconds to turn two points. The court took the berg to have been sighted at about 500 yards. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41 (II. The collision) | "about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard. In this time the ship would travel about 466 yards" … "it may be assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was sighted either from the bridge or crow's nest." | INFERENCE | A reconstruction from the sister ship, not a measurement. Say 'about 500 yards, by the court's reckoning'. |
| T-027 | Damage: starboard bottom, about 10 ft above the keel, nothing above that height. The forepeak, holds 1–3 and boiler rooms 6 and 5 were opened. It extended over about 300 ft. | MR PDF p.44, printed p.42 (III. Extent of the damage) | "caused damage to the bottom of the starboard side of the vessel at about 10 feet above the level of the keel, but there was no damage above this height." … "The forepeak, No. 1 hold, No. 2 hold, No. 3 hold, No. 6 boiler room, No. 5 boiler room." … "The damage extended over a length of about 300 feet." | VERIFIED | Six spaces are listed. 'Forepeak' is the space forward of bulkhead A. See T-031 for the length dispute. |
| T-028 | Formal finding (Q.15): the iceberg pierced the starboard side 'in several places' below the waterline, between the forepeak tank and No. 4 boiler room. | MR PDF p.82, printed p.80 (Q.15 answer) | "A collision with an iceberg which pierced the starboard side of the vessel in several places below the water line between the forepeak tank and No. 4 boiler room." | FINDING | 'In several places', not one long gash. Note that the finding stretches to No. 4 boiler room, although T-035 calls No. 4 damage 'very doubtful'. |
| T-029 | Wilding estimated the total opening at about 12 square feet, spread in separate holes rather than one continuous rip. | W BOTInq19Wilding03 (Q.20422) | "the total area through which water was entering the ship, was somewhere about 12 square feet." … "I believe it must have been in places, that is, not a continuous rip." | TESTIMONY | He worked backward from roughly 16,000 tons of water entering in about 40 minutes against a head of about 25 ft (same answer). Not adopted in the report text. Attribute it to Harland & Wolff's naval architect. |
| T-030 | The Senate report: the impact rolled the ship slightly and tore the plating above the turn of the bilge. Barrett saw water come through a tear about 2 ft above the stokehold plates, about 20 ft below the waterline. | SR AmInqRep05 (SR Collision) | "rolled the vessel slightly and tore the steel plating above the turn of the bilge." … "Leading Fireman Barrett saw the water rushing into the forward fireroom from a tear about two feet above the stokehold floor plates and about twenty feet below the waterline" | VERIFIED | The Senate's 'tear' matches the British '10 ft above the keel'. |
| T-031 | How long the damaged stretch was: 'about 300 feet' in the British report, 'about 200 feet' in Wilding's evidence. | MR PDF p.44, printed p.42; W BOTInq19Wilding06 (MR III; W Q.20732) | MR: "The damage extended over a length of about 300 feet." / W: "We know the hole must have been spread over a length of 200 feet." | CONTESTED | In Q.20422 the transcription has Wilding saying the forward-to-aft puncture distance 'is about 500 feet' and, in the next sentence, '200 feet long'. 12 sq ft ÷ ¾ in ≈ 192 ft, so 500 is very likely a transcription slip. Check the printed minutes before using any length other than the report's 300 ft. |
F · Flooding progression and time to sinking
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-032 | Within 10 minutes the water stood about 14 ft above the keel in the damaged compartments (except No. 5 boiler room). No. 6 boiler room had 8 ft. | MR PDF p.45, printed p.43; MR PDF p.44, printed p.42 (III. Gradual effect of the damage) | "At 10 minutes after the collision the water seems to have risen to about 14 feet above the keel in all these compartments except No. 5 boiler room." … "Ten minutes later it was found that there was water to the height of 8 feet above the double bottom in No. 6 boiler room." | VERIFIED | |
| T-033 | The pumps could not have coped. Flooding the five forward compartments 'inevitably sealed the doom of the ship'. | MR PDF p.47, printed p.45 (III. Observations) | "This was at a rate of inflow with which the ship's pumps could not possibly have coped, so that the damage done to these five compartments alone inevitably sealed the doom of the ship." | FINDING | Observations section ('I am advised'). The engineers' pumping 'could not have saved the ship or prolonged her life to any appreciable extent' (same section). |
| T-034 | The Senate report: the five foremost compartments flooded 'practically immediately'. | SR AmInqRep05 (SR Watertight Compartments) | "As before stated, the testimony shows that the 5 extreme forward compartments were flooded practically immediately" | VERIFIED | Counts forepeak tank, holds 1–3 and the forward boiler room (No. 6), the same five as the British. |
| T-035 | The leaks in boiler rooms 5 and 4 were small: No. 5 was about a 3-inch deck hose, and No. 4 is 'very doubtful'. | MR PDF p.47, printed p.45 (III. Observations) | "It was shown that the leak in No. 5 boiler room was only about equal to the flow of a deck hose pipe about 3 inches in diameter." … "The evidence is very doubtful as to No. 4 being damaged." | VERIFIED | No. 5 bunker: 'Water poured in at that place as it would from an ordinary fire hose', and the bunker door later burst (about an hour after). |
| T-036 | The court's calculation: any three of the four forward compartments could have flooded without sinking her to the bulkhead tops. | MR PDF p.47, printed p.45 (III. Observations) | "In fact, any three of the four forward compartments could have been flooded by the damage received without sinking the ship to the top of her bulkheads." | FINDING | Wilding said the same: 'any three instead of any two' (Q.20364, and Q.20820-1: 'if any three compartments at the forward part had been flooded'). This is a better margin than the two-compartment design rule, for the loading on that night. |
| T-037 | FOUR forward compartments flooded: she would still have floated, with water over some forward bulkheads. FOUR plus No. 6 boiler room: she could not. | MR PDF p.47, printed p.45 (III. Observations) | "But the ship, even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat. But she could not remain afloat with the four compartments and the forward boiler room (No. 6) also flooded." | FINDING | Supports the 'four compartments' line, with care. The four are the forepeak and holds 1, 2 and 3. Say 'by the court's calculation she could have survived the first four flooding', not 'she was designed for four'. |
| T-038 | The cascade: five flooded compartments pulled the bow down until water went over the bulkhead behind No. 6 into No. 5, then over into No. 4, 'and so on in succession'. | MR PDF p.47, printed p.45 (III. Observations) | "The flooding of these five compartments alone would have sunk the ship sufficiently deep to have caused the water to rise above the bulkhead at the after end of the forward boiler room (No. 6) and to flow over into the next boiler room (No. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after bulkhead would be overwhelmed and the water would thereby flow over and fill No. 4 boiler room, and so on in succession to the other boiler rooms till the ship would ultimately fill and sink." | FINDING | The spill-over mechanism, verbatim. This is the spine sentence. Timing: No. 6 'probably reached the top of the bulkhead at the after end ... at the level of E deck, in about one hour after the collision' (III. Gradual effect; INFERENCE). |
| T-039 | The Senate version of the cascade: water overflowed E deck through the open mail-room hatch and other openings, and flooded the compartments behind No. 3 hold. | SR AmInqRep05 (SR Flooding of the Vessel) | "through the open hatch leading from the mail room, and through other openings, water promptly overflowed E deck, below which deck the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth transverse bulkheads ended, and thus flooded the compartments abaft No. 3 hold." | VERIFIED | See T-021 on the bulkhead list. |
| T-040 | Wilding: once No. 6 boiler room and everything forward of it were flooded, the ship was 'absolutely' lost. | W BOTInq19Wilding03 (Q.20355) | "If No. 6 was flooded, the life of this ship, having regard to her construction, had gone? - Absolutely, My Lord, and, of course, No. 6, and all the compartments forward of it." | TESTIMONY | |
| T-041 | Wilding: with the ship as she was, 'no bulkhead arrangement possible forward would have saved the ship'. Carrying the bulkheads to D deck would not have saved her. | W BOTInq19Wilding03 (Q.20353; Q.20371) | "I believe that no bulkhead arrangement possible forward would have saved the ship" … "You mean to say that if the wound came as far aft as No. 5, carrying up the watertight bulkheads to D deck, that would not have saved this ship? - That is right, and that was the real point altogether of that plan." | TESTIMONY | Limits the 'bulkheads too low' angle. One deck higher (D) would not have been enough. |
| T-042 | Bulkheads to C deck might have saved her, but only if No. 4 boiler room was undamaged or its leak was within pump capacity. | MR PDF p.48, printed p.46; W BOTInq19Wilding03 (MR III. Observations; W Q.20373) | MR: "It was stated in evidence that if No. 4 had not been damaged or had only been damaged to an extent within the powers of the pumps to keep under, then, if the bulkheads had been carried to C deck, the ship might have been saved." / W: "Provided that there was not the damage I believe there to have been in No. 4, but if the damage existed in No. 4 it was only a question of delaying it perhaps an hour" | INFERENCE | Conditional counterfactual. Use 'might', and keep the No. 4 condition. |
| T-043 | With all the compartments certainly known to have been flooded, she would have stayed afloat if the bulkhead deck had been watertight. | MR PDF p.49, printed p.47 (III. Effect of suggested additional subdivision) | "I am advised that it is found that with all the compartments certainly known to have been flooded, viz., those forward of No. 4 boiler room, the ship would have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a water-tight deck." | FINDING | The 'lid on the ice-cube tray' counterfactual. The court sent the general question to the Bulkhead Committee. |
| T-044 | Longitudinal subdivision would also have kept her afloat, with a list that could be corrected. | MR PDF p.49, printed p.47 (III. Effect of suggested additional subdivision) | "if the Titanic had been divided in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as supposed, to remain afloat, though with a list which could have been corrected by putting water ballast into suitable places." | FINDING | |
| T-045 | Closing or not closing the watertight doors made no appreciable difference to the sinking. | MR PDF p.49–50, printed p.47–48 (III. Water-tight doors) | "there does not appear to have been any appreciable effect upon the sinking of the ship caused by either shutting or not shutting the doors." | FINDING | Use this against any 'the doors failed' storyline. |
| T-046 | Time: struck at 11.40 p.m., foundered at 2.20 a.m., 2 hours 40 minutes. The Senate report gives 12.47 a.m. New York time. | MR PDF p.37, printed p.35; MR PDF p.44, printed p.42; SR AmInqRep07 (MR II. Ice messages; MR II. Collision; SR Ship Sinking) | MR: "At 11.40 p. m. on that day she struck an iceberg and at 2.20 a. m. on the next day she foundered." / MR: "she foundered in 2 hours and 40 minutes." / SR: "sinking at 12.47 a.m., New York time, April 15." | VERIFIED | Different clocks. The British wireless table gives 12.52 a.m. New York time as 'the official time the Titanic foundered … about 2.20 a. m.', so the Senate's 12.47 a.m. NY is within minutes of 2.20 ship's time. Pick one time base on screen. |
| T-047 | Her end: the stern rose, she reached the perpendicular and went down. The British court said she 'did not break in two'. The Senate said the preponderance of evidence was that she 'sank intact'. | MR PDF p.46, printed p.44; SR AmInqRep07 (MR III. Final effect; SR Ship Sinking) | MR: "The ship did not break in two, and she did, eventually, attain the perpendicular, when the second funnel from aft about reached the water." / SR: "There have been many conflicting statements as to whether the ship broke in two, but the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that she assumed an almost end-on position and sank intact." | CONTESTED | Both inquiries reject a break-up. (The 1985 wreck discovery shows she did break; that is outside these sources and must be cited separately at Gate 1.) Both inquiry texts are on the record: do not say 'the inquiries found she split'. |
G · Ice warnings and how they were handled
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-048 | Six ice messages are recorded: Caronia (9 a.m.), Baltic (1.42 p.m.), Amerika (about 1.45 p.m.), Californian–Antillian (7.30 p.m.), Mesaba (9.40 p.m.), and Californian 'stopped and surrounded by ice' (about 11 p.m.). | MR PDF p.37, printed p.35; MR PDF p.38, printed p.36; MR PDF p.39, printed p.37 (II. Ice messages received) | "At 9 a. m. (Titanic time) on that day a wireless message from the steamship Caronia was received by Capt. Smith." … "At 1.42 p. m., a wireless message from the steamship Baltic was received by Capt. Smith." … "There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the Titanic at 9.40 p. m." | VERIFIED | Times are British, ship's time. The Californian's 'stopped and surrounded by ice' call is in section V (T-084). |
| T-049 | Caronia: 'bergs, growlers, and field ice' in 42° N, 49°–51° W. Captain Smith acknowledged it. | MR PDF p.37, printed p.35 (II. Ice messages received) | "West-bound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42° N., from 49° to 51° W., April 12. Compliments." | VERIFIED | Ice sighted on 12 April, 'at least 48 hours before the time of the collision'. |
| T-050 | Smith handed the Baltic warning to Ismay, who kept it until 7.15 p.m. The court called that 'irregular' and 'improper' but said it had no effect on the navigation. | MR PDF p.38, printed p.36 (II. Ice messages received) | "It remained, however, in Mr. Ismay's possession until 7.15 p. m., when the master asked Mr. Ismay to return it." … "I think it was irregular for the master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the master." | FINDING | The Senate report says the Baltic warning arrived 'about noon'. The British give 1.42 p.m. CONTESTED time; use 1.42 p.m. (British) or 'early afternoon'. |
| T-051 | The Amerika warning (two large bergs) never left the Marconi room. Phillips put it aside to wait for Cape Race. | MR PDF p.38, printed p.36 (II. Ice messages received) | "So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by anyone on board the Titanic outside the Marconi room." … "it was never handed to any officer of the Titanic." | FINDING | The bergs were 'south of the point of the Titanic's disaster'. |
| T-052 | Mesaba, 9.40 p.m.: 'much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. Also field ice.' It clearly showed ice nearby but was never delivered to the bridge. | MR PDF p.39, printed p.37 (II. Ice messages received) | "Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. Also field ice." … "This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the Titanic, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the officers." | FINDING | The 'missed warning' beat. The operator was busy with passenger traffic through Cape Race. The court says 'perhaps', not 'would'. |
| T-053 | Even so, the master and three officers all knew that evening that they were entering a region where ice might be expected. | MR PDF p.41, printed p.39 (II. Ice messages received) | "Capt. Smith, the master; Mr. Murdoch, the first officer; Mr. Lightoller, the second officer; and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected" | FINDING | Qualifies 'missed warnings'. The bridge was not ignorant of ice. The failure was what they did with the knowledge (T-057). |
| T-054 | The course change at 5.50 p.m. was 'so insignificant' that it cannot have been made because of ice (Q.9(c): course not altered because of ice). | MR PDF p.39, printed p.37; MR PDF p.81, printed p.79 (II. Ice messages; Q.9 answer) | "This change of course was so insignificant that in my opinion it can not have been made in consequence of information as to ice." … "No; her course was altered as hereinbefore described, but not in consequence of the information received as to ice." | FINDING | |
| T-055 | Senate finding: the warnings put ice on both sides of the track. There was no conference, 'no heed was given', speed was not relaxed and the lookout was not increased. | SR AmInqRep04 (SR Ice Both to Northward and Southward) | "No general discussion took place among the officers; no conference was called to consider these warnings; no heed was given to them. The speed was not relaxed, the lookout was not increased, and the only vigilance displayed by the officer of the watch was by instructions to the lookouts to keep "a sharp lookout for ice."" | FINDING | Senate heading: 'Ice Both to Northward and Southward of Steamship Titanic's Track'. Stronger language than the British. |
| T-056 | The Senate counts 'at least three' warnings that reached Captain Smith directly that day, the first 'about noon' from the Baltic. | SR AmInqRep04 (SR Weather Conditions During Voyage) | "the testimony is conclusive that at least three of these warnings came direct to the commander of the Titanic on the day the accident, the first about noon, from the Baltic, of the White Star Line." | CONTESTED | The Senate omits the Caronia's 9 a.m. message as delivered to Smith and puts the Baltic at noon. The British have Caronia at 9 a.m. and Baltic at 1.42 p.m. Use the British times with attribution. |
H · Speed, weather and the 'practice'
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-057 | Speed: about 22 knots (British, Q.14: 'excessive'), never reduced. The Senate gives 'not less than 21 knots', her highest of the voyage, with daily runs of 464, 519 and 546 miles. | MR PDF p.41, printed p.39; MR PDF p.82, printed p.80; SR AmInqRep04 (II. Speed of the ship; Q.14 answer) | MR: "The entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship's maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable." / MR: "Answer. (a) About 22 knots. (b) Yes." / SR: "Just prior to the collision the ship was making her maximum speed of the voyage - not less than 21 knots, or 24 1/4 miles per hour." / SR: "The first day's run was 464 miles, the second day's run was 519 miles, the third day's run was 546 miles." | CONTESTED | Q.14 asked: 'Was such speed excessive under the circumstances?' Answer: Yes. 22 (British) against 'not less than 21' (Senate); the two are compatible. On screen: 'about 22 knots' (British) or '21–22 knots'. Engines at 75 revolutions (British). |
| T-058 | The night was clear and moonless, with a flat calm. The temperature fell to 32°F. No moon and no wind meant no breaking water at the foot of a berg. | MR PDF p.42, printed p.40 (II. The weather conditions) | "There was no moon, the stars were out, and there was not a cloud in the sky." … "and by about 7.30 p. m. the temperature was 33° F., and it eventually fell to 32° F." | VERIFIED | Lightoller told Smith it was 'a flat calm' and regretted the lack of breeze 'whilst we were going through the ice region' (same section). The Senate report: 'exceptionally clear. There was no haze'. Smith on haze, as quoted by the Senate: 'If it was in a slight degree hazy there would be no doubt we should have to go very slowly'. |
| T-059 | Why speed was kept: for 25 years or more, liners in clear weather near ice at night had kept their course and speed and trusted to the lookout. 'The event has proved the practice to be bad.' | MR PDF p.42, printed p.40 (II. Action that should have been taken) | "the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger." … "But the event has proved the practice to be bad." | FINDING | The normalized-practice link in the chain. Mersey traces its root to 'competition and ... the desire of the public for quick passages'. S. Doc. 933 prints 'bound in competition' (scan checked); the titanicinquiry transcription of the British original reads 'found'. |
| T-060 | Mersey did not blame Captain Smith, finding no negligence, but warned that the same act would be negligence in future. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41 (II. Action that should have been taken) | "in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Capt. Smith with blame." … "What was a mistake in the case of the Titanic would without doubt be negligence in any similar case in the future." | FINDING | Mersey calls it 'a very grievous mistake'. Keep the no-villain framing. |
| T-061 | Mersey rejected the idea that Ismay's presence pushed Smith to speed: he was not trying for a record or an exceptionally quick passage. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41 (II. Action that should have been taken) | "The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage." | FINDING | The answer to the 'Ismay ordered full speed for a record' myth (X-07). |
I · Lookout and binoculars (as the inquiries treat them)
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-062 | British finding Q.10(b): the lookout was not sufficient. An extra man should have been at the stemhead, with an officer watching from both sides of the bridge. | MR PDF p.82, printed p.80 (Q.10 answer) | "it is not considered that the lookout was sufficient. An extra lookout should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp lookout should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer." | FINDING | 'Without implying that those actually on duty were not keeping a good lookout'. The fault is the arrangement, not the men. At 9.30 p.m. the crow's nest was told 'to keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers' (II. Ice messages). |
| T-063 | Binoculars, British finding Q.11: not provided to or used by the lookouts, and their use was NOT considered necessary or usual. No searchlights. | MR PDF p.82, printed p.80 (Q.11 answer) | "Answer. (a) No. (b) No. (c) No. (d) No. (e) No; but searchlights may at times be of service." | FINDING | Q.11(a) 'Were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men?' No. (b) 'Is the use of them necessary or usual in such circumstances?' No. The British court did not treat missing binoculars as a cause. The Senate report text is silent on binoculars; only Smith's speech raises it (T-064). |
| T-064 | Senator Smith's speech (not the committee report) repeats the lookout's testimony: with glasses he could have seen the berg 'soon enough to get out of the way'. | SS PDF p.15 (Smith speech, S. Doc. 850) | "who says in his testimony that if he had been supplied with glasses" | TESTIMONY | This is the lookout's claim (Frederick Fleet in the hearings; the speech passage does not name him) as relayed in a speech. It is not a finding of either inquiry. The speech also says glasses 'were denied him by Second Officer Lightoller'. There is no 'key' in it (X-02). |
J · Lifeboats: number, capacity, the Board of Trade rule, the gap
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-065 | Boats: 14 lifeboats (65 each), 2 emergency cutters (40 each) and 4 Engelhardt collapsibles (47 each), 20 boats in all for 1,178 persons. | MR PDF p.27, printed p.25 (I. Life-saving appliances) | "Twenty boats in all were fitted on the vessel" … "Or a total of 11,327.9 cubic feet for 1,178 persons." | VERIFIED | Q.5(d) answer: 80 + 910 + 188 = 1,178. |
| T-066 | The Senate report gives a capacity of 1,176, rating the emergency boats at 35 each and the collapsibles at 49 each. | SR AmInqRep03 (SR Boat Davits and Lifeboats) | "2 emergency sea boats, of capacity for 35 persons each, or 70 persons; 4 collapsible boats, of capacity for 49 persons each, or 196 persons. Total lifeboat capacity, 1,176." | CONTESTED | 1,178 (British) against 1,176 (Senate). Use '1,178' (British), or 'about 1,200 places'. The difference does not matter to the story. |
| T-067 | The davits could have handled 48 boats. She carried 20, which met every Board of Trade requirement. | SR AmInqRep03 (SR Boat Davits and Lifeboats) | "The davits were thus capable of handling 48 boats, whereas the ship carried but 16 lifeboats and 4 collapsibles, fulfilling all the requirements of the British Board of Trade." | VERIFIED | Senate report only. The British report does not give the davit capacity. The report calls them '16 sets of double-acting boat davits'. |
| T-068 | THE RULE: the 1894 Board of Trade boat table was based on gross tonnage, not on the number of people carried. | MR PDF p.63, printed p.61 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage increased." | VERIFIED | Table dated 9 March 1894, in force 1 June 1894. |
| T-069 | The table stopped at '10,000 and upwards': 16 boats under davits and 5,500 cubic feet minimum, whatever the size of the ship. | MR PDF p.64, printed p.62 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "The table, however, stopped short at the point where the gross tonnage of the vessels reached "10,000 and upwards." As to all such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity of 5,500 cubic feet." | VERIFIED | When the table was written the largest emigrant ship was the Lucania, of 12,952 tons. Titanic was 46,328, about 3.6 times larger, under the same top row. |
| T-070 | With the emigrant-ship rule added, Titanic needed 9,625 cubic feet, about 962 persons. She carried 1,178, 'far in excess' of the law. | MR PDF p.64, printed p.62 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "the requirements under the rules and table together exacted a provision of 9,625 cubic feet of lifeboat and raft accommodation" … "this would be equivalent to a provision for 962 persons." … "The Titanic, in fact, carried boat accommodation for 1,178 persons, a number far in excess of the requirements of the table and rules" | VERIFIED | Spine fact. Legal requirement 962; carried 1,178; on board 2,201. |
| T-071 | Rule 12 would have cut the requirement further, to 756 persons, for ships with approved watertight compartments. The owners never applied for it. | MR PDF p.64, printed p.62 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "If this rule had become applicable to the Titanic, then the total cubical lifeboat or raft accommodation which she would have been required to carry would not have been more than 7,562 (equivalent to accommodation for 756 persons)." … "It did not, however, become applicable for the owners never required the board of trade to express any opinion under the rule as to the efficiency of the water-tight compartments." | VERIFIED | The two chains meet here: the rules traded boats against subdivision. Mersey: Rule 12 'ought to be abolished'. |
| T-072 | The Board did not revise the 1894 table until 1912, although ships had reached 45,000 tons. Mersey called the omission 'blameable'. | MR PDF p.65, printed p.63; MR PDF p.78, printed p.76 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "it can not be that the provision for boat accommodation made in 1894 for vessels of 10,000 tons and upward remained sufficient to 1910, when vessels of 45,000 tons were being built." … "The outstanding circumstance in it is the omission, during so many years, to revise the rules of 1894 and this, I think, was blameable" | FINDING | Sir Alfred Chalmers' defence ('the safest mode of travel in the world') is quoted in full in the same section. |
| T-073 | ...but Mersey doubted that a revised rule would have saved more lives, because the boats she had were filled to less than two-thirds. | MR PDF p.78, printed p.76 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "I am, however, doubtful whether even if the rules had been revised the change would have been such as to have required boat accommodation which would have increased the number of lives saved." … "the Titanic boat accommodation was utilized to less than two-thirds of its capacity." | FINDING | Do not simplify to 'more boats = more saved'. The British court said a revised rule probably would not have required more boats than she had. |
| T-074 | Archer's 1911 draft scale (24,937 cu ft) would have covered the 2,201 aboard, but not the 3,547 she could carry. His philosophy: build the ship to be 'her own lifeboat'. | MR PDF p.66, printed p.64 (VI. Board of Trade's administration) | "By his scale a vessel of the tonnage of the Titanic would have had to carry boat accommodation equivalent to at least 24,937 cubic feet, which would have been sufficient to hold all and more than all the persons who were on board at the time of the disaster (2,201)." … "The great object was so to build the ship that in the event of a disaster she would be her own lifeboat." | VERIFIED | Archer was the Board's principal ship surveyor. Footnote 4: since the disaster he 'had modified his views' and thought Rule 12 should be discontinued. Good line for the 'own lifeboat' idea. |
| T-075 | Boats left partly filled: No. 1 with 12 of 40, No. 7 with 27 of 65, No. 6 with 28 of 65. The Carpathia picked up 712 from the boats. | MR PDF p.53–54, printed p.51–52 (IV. The boats) | "No. 1 certainly left with only 12; this was an emergency boat with a carrying capacity of 40. No. 7 left with only 27, and No. 6 with only 28; these were lifeboats with a carrying capacity of 65 each" | VERIFIED | The per-boat witness counts are 'quite unreliable' (the boat table adds to 854, against 712 actually saved). Do not on-screen a per-boat table as fact. |
| T-076 | There was no proper boat drill or muster. The Senate report: the only drill was lowering two starboard boats at Southampton. | MR PDF p.51, printed p.49; SR AmInqRep03 (MR IV. The boats; SR Only Two Lifeboats Lowered) | MR: "There had been no proper boat drill nor a boat muster." / SR: "the only drill while the vessel lay at Southampton or on the voyage consisted in lowering two lifeboats on the starboard side into the water" | VERIFIED | Senate: the crew boat list was not posted until 'several days after sailing'. |
| T-077 | Senate finding: failing to fill the boats to capacity 'unquestionably resulted in the needless sacrifice of several hundred lives'. | SR AmInqRep07 (SR Lifeboats Cleared Away) | "The failure to utilize all lifeboats to their recognized capacity for safety unquestionably resulted in the needless sacrifice of several hundred lives which might otherwise have been saved." | FINDING | The British equivalent: 'if there had been better organization the results would have been more satisfactory'. |
K · Persons on board, saved and lost
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-078 | On board when she left Queenstown (British): 885 crew + 1,316 passengers = 2,201. | MR PDF p.34, printed p.32 (I. Crew and passengers) | "the total number of persons employed on board in any capacity was 885." … "The total number of passengers on board was 1,316." … "In all, 2,201 persons were on board." | VERIFIED | The British crew figure excludes the eight bandsmen, who were listed as second-class passengers. |
| T-079 | Saved (British): 711 of 2,201 (32.30%). The Carpathia took 712 from the boats, and one died. Lives lost: 1,490. | MR PDF p.58, printed p.56; MR PDF p.57, printed p.55; MR PDF p.7, printed p.5 (IV. Numbers saved; Introduction) | "Total on board saved 711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent." … "From these boats he took on board 712 persons, one of whom died shortly afterwards." … "the loss of 1,490 lives" | VERIFIED | 2,201 − 711 = 1,490. Q.21(a): 'Seven hundred and twelve, rescued by Carpathia'. |
| T-080 | Senate totals: 2,223 on board (1,324 passengers + 899 crew), 706 saved, 1,517 lost (32% saved). | SR AmInqRep03 (SR Summary of Passengers and Survivors; SR Departure) | "Total | 531 | 1,692 | 2,223 | 374 | 332 | 706 | 157 | 1,360 | 1,517 | 32" … "numbering 899 persons." | CONTESTED | Use attributed figures. British: 2,201 / 711 / 1,490. Senate: 2,223 / 706 / 1,517. Crew: 885 (British, without the band) against 899 (Senate). The inquiries counted from different lists. On screen: 'about 1,500 died'. |
| T-081 | By class (British): first class 203 of 325 saved (62.46%), second 118 of 285 (41.40%), third 178 of 706 (25.21%). Adult males overall: 338 of 1,667 (20.27%). | MR PDF p.86, printed p.84; MR PDF p.58, printed p.56 (IV. Numbers saved) | "203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent." … "178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent." … "Adult males 338 out of 1,667, or 20.27 per cent." | VERIFIED | The Senate gives third class as 710 on board and 174 saved (25%). That is CONTESTED; attribute it. The Senate summary table prints third-class men as 476 against 486 in the class table. 486 fits the totals (816 men), so 476 is a misprint. |
| T-082 | Both inquiries rejected discrimination against third class: 'They were not unfairly treated' (British); 'no distinction was made' (Senate). | MR PDF p.56, printed p.54; SR AmInqRep07 (MR IV. Third-class passengers; SR No Distinction) | MR: "They were not unfairly treated." / SR: "In loading boats no distinction was made between first, second, and third class passengers, although the proportion of lost is larger among third class passengers than in either of the other classes." | FINDING | The British blame the location of the quarters, reluctance to leave and language barriers. This is contested in modern scholarship, but not in these sources. |
L · The Californian
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-083 | The Californian stopped at 10.20 p.m. in field ice. Her one wireless operator was asleep when Titanic called. | MR PDF p.58, printed p.56; MR PDF p.56, printed p.54 (V. Californian; IV. Means taken) | "when she was obliged to stop and reverse engines because she was running into field ice" … "she had only one Marconi operator on board and he was asleep." | VERIFIED | Leyland Line, 6,223 tons gross, owned by IMM, the same group as Titanic (V.). |
| T-084 | When the Californian warned Titanic that it was stopped and surrounded by ice, Titanic's operator cut it off: 'Keep out' (British) or 'Shut up. I am busy. I am working Cape Race' (Senate). | MR PDF p.59, printed p.57; SR AmInqRep04 (MR V.; SR Ice Warnings) | MR: ""We are stopped and surrounded by ice." The Titanic replied: "Keep out."" / SR: "Shut up. I am busy. I am working Cape Race." | CONTESTED | Same event, different wording. The British explain that the Californian's close signal drowned out Cape Race. Attribute whichever wording is used. |
| T-085 | Rockets: Titanic fired about eight and the Californian saw eight. Mersey: the ship the Californian saw was the Titanic. | MR PDF p.62, printed p.60 (V. Californian) | "The number sent up by the Titanic was about eight. The Californian saw eight." … "These circumstances convince me that the ship seen by the Californian was the Titanic" | FINDING | |
| T-086 | Distance: probably more than 5 miles but not more than 8 to 10. The ice was loose, and she could have pushed through and 'might have saved many if not all' of the lives lost. | MR PDF p.62, printed p.60 (V. Californian; Q.24 answer) | "I am advised that the distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles." … "Had she done so she might have saved many if not all of the lives that were lost." | FINDING | Q.24(b): 'She could have reached the Titanic if she had made the attempt when she saw the first rocket. She made no attempt.' |
| T-087 | Senate finding: the Californian was nearer than her captain's 19 miles, saw the distress signals and failed to respond, which placed 'a grave responsibility' on her commander. | SR AmInqRep06 (SR Californian's Responsibility) | "was nearer the Titanic than the 19 miles reported by her captain, and that her officers and crew saw the distress signals of the Titanic and failed to respond to them in accordance with the dictates of humanity, international usage, and the requirements of law." … "In our opinion such conduct, whether arising from indifference or gross carelessness, is most reprehensible" | FINDING | Captain Lord gave his stopped position as 42° 05' N, 50° 07' W, 19½ miles north (SR). The British report prints the position once as '57° 7´ W' and once as '50° 7´ W'; 57° is a misprint in the report itself (it appears in both the scan and the titanicinquiry transcription). Both inquiries condemn the Californian. Lord's later rehabilitation efforts are outside these sources. |
M · Distress calls and rescue
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-088 | CQD went out at 12.15 a.m. The Carpathia, 58 miles away, heard 'Come at once, we have struck a berg', and ran at 17½ knots. She stopped at 4.05 and picked up the first boat at 4.10. | MR PDF p.56, printed p.54; MR PDF p.57, printed p.55 (IV. Means taken; IV. Rescue by Carpathia) | "At 12.15 a. m. the distress signal CQD was sent." … "This was heard by the Cunard steamer Carpathia, which was at this time bound from New York to Liverpool and 58 miles away." … "He sighted the first boat (No. 2) and picked her up at 4.10." | VERIFIED | The British court records 'its great admiration of Capt. Rostron's conduct'. The Senate: 'deserving of the highest praise'. |
| T-089 | The boats began going down at about 12.45 (No. 7 first). The last wireless call ('CQ') went out at 2.17. The court warned that all times after the collision are unreliable. | MR PDF p.52, printed p.50; MR PDF p.56, printed p.54 (IV. The boats; IV. Means taken) | "at about 12.45 Mr. Murdoch gave the order to lower No. 7 boat" … "This message was sent at 2.17." … "all the times subsequent to the collision which are mentioned by the witnesses, are unreliable." | VERIFIED | Put an 'approximate' tag on every post-collision clock time. |
N · Recommendations of both inquiries
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-090 | British Recommendations 1–5: the Bulkhead Committee to study a double skin, longitudinal bulkheads and watertight decks. The aim: stay afloat with 'the greatest practicable proportion of her length' open to the sea. The Board of Trade to be empowered to require designs early. | MR PDF p.88, printed p.86 (VIII. Recommendations) | "the object being to secure that the ship shall remain afloat with the greatest practicable proportion of her length in free communication with the sea." … "That the board of trade should be empowered by the legislature to require the production of the designs and specifications of all ships in their early stages of construction" | FINDING | Recommendations 3 and 5. |
| T-091 | British Recommendations 6–8: base boat capacity on persons carried, not tonnage; abolish Rule 12; boats for all on board. | MR PDF p.88, printed p.86 (VIII. Recommendations) | "That the provision of lifeboat and raft accommodation on board such ships should be based on the number of persons intended to be carried in the ship and not upon tonnage." … "That the accommodation should be sufficient for all persons on board" | FINDING | Rec. 8 allows the Board to modify it 'in special cases where ... such provision is impracticable'. |
| T-092 | British Recommendations 16, 18, 20, 21, 24: weekly boat, fire and watertight-door drills; sight tests for lookouts; continuous wireless watch; moderate speed or a course change near reported ice at night; an international conference. | MR PDF p.89, printed p.87; MR PDF p.90, printed p.88 (VIII. Recommendations) | "That every man taking a lookout in such ships should undergo a sight test at reasonable intervals." … "such installation should be worked with a sufficient number of trained operators to secure a continuous service by night and day." … "when ice is reported in or near the track the ship should proceed in the dark hours at a moderate speed or alter her course so as to go well clear of the danger zone." … "steps should be taken to call an international conference" | FINDING | Rec. 21's wording reappears almost word for word in SOLAS 1914 Art. 10 (T-096). |
| T-093 | Senate recommendations: lifeboats for every passenger and crew member; at least four trained crew per boat; drills twice a month; two searchlights; a wireless operator on duty at all times with auxiliary power; rockets used for anything except distress made a misdemeanor. | SR AmInqRep10 (SR Recommendations) | "definitely require sufficient lifeboats to accommodate every passenger and every member of the crew." … "There must be an operator on duty at all times, day and night, to insure the immediate receipt of all distress, warning, or other important calls." … "The committee recommends that the firing of rockets or candles on the high seas for any other purpose than as a signal of distress be made a misdemeanor." | FINDING | Ismay told the committee that IMM had already ordered that no ship sail with more people than its boat capacity (p. 985). |
| T-094 | Senate structural recommendation: bulkheads forward and aft of the machinery spaces to go watertight to the uppermost continuous structural deck, which itself must be watertight. Survive any two adjacent compartments flooded. A watertight inner skin. | SR AmInqRep10 (SR Recommendations) | "The transverse bulkheads forward and abaft the machinery spaces should he continued watertight vertically to the uppermost continuous structural deck. The uppermost continuous structural deck should be fitted watertight." … "bulkheads so spaced that any two adjacent compartments of the ship may be flooded without destroying the flotability or stability of the ship." | FINDING | The direct answer to the spill-over failure: close the top of the tray. The transcription reads 'should he' for 'should be'. |
O · What changed: SOLAS 1914
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-095 | SOLAS 1914 Art. 6–7: the parties will set up an ice-patrol and ice-observation service in the North Atlantic (two vessels), and invite the United States to run it. | SOLAS PDF p.8 (SOLAS Art. 6–7) | "they will establish in the North Atlantic Ocean with the least possible delay a service for the study and observation of ice conditions and a service of ice patrol." … "The Government of the United States is invited to undertake the management of the three services of derelict destruction, study and observation of ice conditions, and ice patrol." | VERIFIED | Copy printed as Canada Sessional Paper No. 129, 1914. The source does not say when the patrol began operating (gap). |
| T-096 | SOLAS Art. 10: when ice is reported on or near the route, ships must go at moderate speed at night or steer well clear. | SOLAS PDF p.9 (SOLAS Art. 10) | "When ice is reported on, or near, the route, the master of every ship propelled by machinery is bound to proceed at night at a moderate speed, or to alter his course so as to go well clear of the danger zone." | VERIFIED | This turns the 'practice' of T-059 around: slowing down near reported ice becomes a treaty obligation. The OCR reads 'ever}'' for 'every'. |
| T-097 | SOLAS Art. 40, 'Fundamental Principle': no ship may at any moment carry more people than its lifeboats and pontoon rafts can hold. | SOLAS PDF p.18 (SOLAS Art. 40) | "At no moment of its voyage may a ship have on board a total number of persons greater than that for which accommodation is provided in the lifeboats and the pontoon life-rafts on board." | VERIFIED | Lifeboats for all, the end of the tonnage table. |
| T-098 | SOLAS Art. 17: ships to be 'as efficiently subdivided as is possible', with floodable-length rules scaled to length and service. Applies in full to new vessels laid down after 1 July 1915. | SOLAS PDF p.11 (SOLAS Art. 16–17) | "Vessels shall be as efficiently subdivided as is possible, having regard to the nature of the services for which they are intended." … "New vessels are those the keel of which is laid after the 1st July, 1915." | VERIFIED | Existing ships were to be judged 'on their merits'. Not retroactive. Our inference from Art. 16: a ship laid down earlier, such as the Olympic, counted as 'existing' and was judged on its merits. |
| T-099 | SOLAS radiotelegraph: wireless required for ships with 50 or more aboard. Class I passenger ships to have a continuous service. | SOLAS PDF p.14; SOLAS PDF p.15 (SOLAS Art. 31, 33) | "be fitted with a radiotelegraph installation, if they have on board fifty or more persons in all." … "Class I.— Ships having a continuous service." | VERIFIED | Art. 34 lets governments require a continuous watch 'as soon as' they think it useful. So the 24-hour watch was phased in, not immediate. |
| T-100 | SOLAS 1914 was signed at London on 20 January 1914, to come into force on 1 July 1915. | SOLAS PDF p.25 (SOLAS Art. 69) | "This Convention shall come into force on the 1st July, 1915" | VERIFIED | Signature date from the text: 'Signed at London, 20th January, 1914'. Gap: this source cannot show whether it actually came into force. It was overtaken by the First World War. That needs a separate source before any 'it took effect' line. |
Things the inquiries do NOT say (popular-retelling check)
| ID | Claim | What the record says | Verbatim | Ledger rows |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| X-01 | "The builders/owners claimed she was unsinkable" | Neither report records Harland & Wolff or White Star calling Titanic 'unsinkable'. The Senate report never uses the word. The British report uses it twice, both times looking forward: the 1911 Advisory Committee wanted ships made 'as unsinkable as possible', and Mersey wrote 'when naval architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable'. Harland & Wolff's Wilding rejected the word under oath. The closest the record comes is Ismay's 'especially constructed [to] float with her two largest watertight compartments full', which the Senate report quotes. | MR PDF p.67, printed p.65: "rendered as unsinkable as possible" / MR PDF p.78, printed p.76: "When naval architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable" / W BOTInq20Wilding01: "Pardon me; "unsinkability" does not describe the thing quite rightly. It is that ships shall remain afloat with any two compartments flooded." | T-012, T-014 |
| X-02 | The binocular-locker key (Second Officer Blair kept the key) | Neither report mentions a key, a locker or David Blair. The British court answered Q.11 that binoculars were not provided to or used by the lookouts, and that their use was not 'necessary or usual'. The Senate report makes no binocular finding. Only Senator Smith's speech relays the lookout's claim that glasses 'were denied him by Second Officer Lightoller'. Lightoller, not Blair, and no key. | SS PDF p.15: "were denied him by Second Officer Lightoller" / MR PDF p.82, printed p.80: "Answer. (a) No. (b) No. (c) No. (d) No. (e) No; but searchlights may at times be of service." | T-063, T-064 |
| X-03 | A coal-bunker fire weakened the bulkhead and doomed the ship | Neither report mentions a bunker fire. The only fires mentioned are boiler fires being drawn after the collision. The British report says the damaged No. 5 starboard bunker 'had no coal in it' at the collision, and that its door burst from water pressure about an hour later. (Fire evidence was given by stoker Barrett on Day 4 of the British Inquiry, which is not in sources/. It did not reach either report.) | MR PDF p.45, printed p.43: "At the time of the collision this bunker had no coal in it." / MR PDF p.83, printed p.81: "some of the boiler fires were drawn" | T-035 |
| X-04 | Brittle steel or weak rivets made the hull unzip | Neither report treats material quality as a factor. The British report's only mention of rivets is descriptive ('hydraulic riveted' double plating), and it found that charges of lax Board of Trade inspection of the work 'broke down'. Wilding estimated about 12 sq ft of separate openings, not a continuous rip. The modern metallurgical work belongs to Gate 1 sources, not to these. | MR PDF p.25, printed p.23: "This double plating was hydraulic riveted." / MR PDF p.79, printed p.77: "The investigation of the charges took much time, but it only served to show that the officials had discharged their duties carefully and well." | T-028, T-029 |
| X-05 | "A 300-foot gash" / one long continuous tear | The British court found damage over about 300 ft 'in several places'. Wilding's estimate is about 12 sq ft in total, 'not a continuous rip', averaging about ¾ inch if it were spread along the whole length. 300 ft is the extent of the damage, not the size of the hole. | MR PDF p.82, printed p.80: "pierced the starboard side of the vessel in several places below the water line" / W BOTInq19Wilding03: "I believe it must have been in places, that is, not a continuous rip." | T-027 to T-031 |
| X-06 | "The inquiries found she broke in two" | Both inquiries found the opposite. The British report says she 'did not break in two'. The Senate report says the preponderance of evidence was that she 'sank intact'. The split is a 1985 wreck finding, from outside these sources. If shown, say the 1912 inquiries got this wrong, and cite the wreck evidence separately. | MR PDF p.46, printed p.44: "The ship did not break in two" / SR AmInqRep07: "sank intact" | T-047 |
| X-07 | Ismay pushed Smith to go fast for a record or an early arrival | The British court heard the suggestion and rejected it: Smith 'was not trying to make any record passage'. The Senate report makes no such finding. The Ismay connection that is on the record: he held the Baltic ice warning in his pocket until 7.15 p.m., which the court called 'improper' but found had no effect on the navigation. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41: "The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage." / MR PDF p.38, printed p.36: "improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it" | T-050, T-061 |
| X-08 | Captain Smith was reckless or negligent (a villain) | The British court found 'a very grievous mistake' but no negligence, and could not blame him. The Senate committee report does not personally condemn Smith. The line 'his indifference to danger was one of the direct and contributing causes' comes from Senator Smith's floor speech (S. Doc. 850), not the committee report. Attribute it to the senator. | MR PDF p.43, printed p.41: "in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Capt. Smith with blame." / SS PDF p.17: "his indifference to danger was one of the direct and contributing causes of this unnecessary tragedy" | T-060 |
| X-09 | Third-class passengers were locked below behind gates | Both reports reject deliberate discrimination. The British: 'They were not unfairly treated'. The Senate: 'no distinction was made' in loading. Neither report mentions locked gates. The death-rate gap by class is real (25% of third class saved, 62% of first) and is explained by the British as location, reluctance and language. | MR PDF p.56, printed p.54: "They were not unfairly treated." / SR AmInqRep07: "In loading boats no distinction was made between first, second, and third class passengers" | T-081, T-082 |
| X-10 | The watertight doors failed, or closing them sank her faster | The British court found no appreciable effect either way, and no difficulty in working the doors. They were shut 'in good time'. | MR PDF p.50, printed p.48: "There does not appear to have been any difficulty in working the water-tight doors. They appear to have been shut in good time after the collision." | T-045 |
| X-11 | She broke the law by carrying too few lifeboats | She carried more than the law required: capacity for 1,178 against a legal requirement of about 962. The failure was in the rule (a tonnage table frozen at '10,000 and upwards' since 1894), not in compliance. | MR PDF p.64, printed p.62: "a number far in excess of the requirements of the table and rules" | T-004, T-068 to T-070 |
| X-12 | Enough lifeboats would have saved everyone | Not what the British court concluded. Mersey doubted that a revised rule would have required more boats than she had, and noted that the boats she had were filled to less than two-thirds. The Senate report did find that under-filling cost 'several hundred lives'. On screen, keep the capacity gap (1,178 places for 2,201 people) separate from the loading failure (about 712 saved). | MR PDF p.78, printed p.76: "utilized to less than two-thirds of its capacity" / SR AmInqRep07: "needless sacrifice of several hundred lives" | T-073, T-077 |
| X-13 | The Californian was 19–20 miles off and could not have helped | Both inquiries rejected this. The British: probably 5 to 10 miles, and she 'could have reached the Titanic if she had made the attempt'. The Senate: she was nearer than the 19 miles her captain reported, and failed to respond to the distress signals. | MR PDF p.87, printed p.85: "She could have reached the Titanic if she had made the attempt when she saw the first rocket. She made no attempt." / SR AmInqRep06: "was nearer the Titanic than the 19 miles reported by her captain" | T-086, T-087 |
| X-14 | "She was designed to survive four flooded compartments" | The design standard in both reports is TWO adjoining compartments. 'Four' is the British court's calculation of what she could have survived on that night's waterline. 'Three' is Wilding's statement for the forward compartments. Do not present four as the design specification. | MR PDF p.25, printed p.23: "the ship would remain afloat in the event of any two adjoining compartments being flooded" / MR PDF p.47, printed p.45: "But the ship, even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat." | T-010, T-036, T-037 |
Rows added from Dave's treatment review (2026-10-07), verified against official pages
| ID | Claim | Source and page | Verbatim | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-101 | The 1914 SOLAS Convention was written in response to Titanic. World War I prevented it from coming into force, and its provisions carried into the 1929 convention. | IMO, "Life-Saving Appliances: SOLAS history", https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/historyoflsa-default.aspx | "Although the 1914 SOLAS Convention was prevented from coming into force due to World War I, it did contain basic fire safety requirements which were later carried over to the 1929 SOLAS Convention." | VERIFIED (official) |
| T-102 | Ice patrols followed the sinking. The Navy could not send ships in 1913, so the Revenue Cutter Service took over the Grand Banks reconnaissance. In 1914 the first SOLAS conference formally established the International Ice Patrol. | USCG Navigation Center, "International Ice Patrol History", https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/international-ice-patrol-history | "In 1914, the International Ice Patrol (IIP) was officially established by the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention" | VERIFIED (official) |